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This paper argues that the analysis of changes in the social position of women needs to 
distinguish between levels of social practice and psychic subjectification. The argument 
draws on Lacan‟s conception of the relationship between subjectivity, desire and sexual 
difference to describe gendered aspects of subjectivity embedded within the (re)organisation 
of social fields. The data is taken from a comparative case study of undergraduate modules in 
four universities, and the analysis identifies gendered differences in the tutors‟ pedagogic and 
disciplinary practice. These differences suggest that while the practice of the female tutors, in 
different ways, constituted recodifications of existing disciplinary and pedagogic practices, 
these instances of recodification can simultaneously be interpreted as gendered identifications 
with an external, feminine position in relation to the dominant structures of the Symbolic 
Order. Thus, while change may be instituted at the level of practice within specific social 
fields, at the level of subjectification the recodifications that mark such changes can be read 
as a reiteration of primary gendered identifications. 
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Recodifications of academic positions and reiterations of desire: change but continuity 
in gendered subjectivities 
 
Introduction 
In this paper I am going to distinguish different levels of social practice and psychic 
subjectification within which it is possible to describe shifts in the regulation of gender. The 
more abstract level of my argument is that it is helpful to maintain a distinction between 
changes in the codes regulating practices within social fields and changes at the level of 
gender as a primary mark of human subjectivity within the Symbolic Order.  At a more 
concrete level, I am arguing that while it is possible to identify gendered shifts in the 
codification of disciplinary and pedagogic practices within universities, the subjectivity of 
individual academics is still primarily embodied within the codes of hegemonic heterosexual 
gender identities. The description of these simultaneous levels of social regulation and 
psychic subjectification may contribute to existing analyses of the nature and extent of 
transformations in the position of women in contemporary society (for example, McNay, 
2000, Skeggs, 2005). It may also help to shed light on the gendered nature of tensions in the 
pedagogic and disciplinary positioning of both women and men within the academy.  
 
I am drawing on a piece of empirical research comparing literature and politics modules in 
contrasting institutions within the UK higher education system. Both disciplines and 
institutions were selected to represent contrasting positions in relation to social hierarchies. 
The study of politics is closely associated with the role of government, while contemporary 
literary studies tends to take a more explicitly politicised or critical position in relation to the 
existing social order. There is also a clear division in the higher education sector in the UK, 
with prestigious, selective institutions tending to recruit students from privileged social 
backgrounds, while the access oriented, ex-polytechnics tend to recruit more „non-traditional‟ 
students. The sites that formed the empirical object of the research were American Literature 
and Political Thought modules on undergraduate degree courses. I observed two American 
Literature and two Political Thought modules, in two prestigious, highly selective universities 
(West University and North University) and in two „new‟, access oriented universities (South 
University and East University). I participated in a series of at least six sessions on each of 
the four modules. I videoed the sessions and interviewed students and tutors about the 
discussions that I had observed.   
 
The main object of the research was to identify the effects of contrasting disciplinary and 
institutional settings on the positioning of students within class discussions, with gender as a 
central organising principle within the analysis. Thus, in my initial conceptualisation of the 
research I was trying to capture the relational effects of gender, discipline and institution on 
student subject positions. However, during the analysis these same relational effects also 
emerged in relation to the four class tutors. I am explaining the slight marginality of the 
analysis of tutor positions within the initial design of the research project because despite my 
clear conceptualisation of gender as a central criterion for analysis within the study, I was 
oddly disconcerted, and saddened, by the emergence of a strong conformity with codes of 
gender in the classroom practice of the tutors. This may merely signify my own naïvity, but, 
for me, it also reaffirmed an empirical basis for my gendered interpretations. When I was 
analysing student positions, to some extent at least, I only found what I was already looking 
for. In contrast, the emergence of gendered patterns in my analysis of the academic practice 
of the tutors was something I had not anticipated. It is the analysis of tutor positions in 
relation to both disciplinary and pedagogic cultures that I am going to present in this paper. 
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My argument is that while at one level of analysis it is possible to interpret the practice of 
female university tutors as re-codifying disciplinary and pedagogic cultures within the 
university, at the same time it is also possible to identify ways in which these very acts of re-
codification reiterate the external position of the feminine in relation to the structures of the 
Symbolic Order. Before engaging with the data, I want to explain the framework I am using 
for conceptualising gender, using the association Lacan introduces between feminine 
positions and his conception of desire. 
 
Feminine jouissance as an exemplar of unarticulated desire 
Lacan is very precise about the meaning of „desire‟. His concept can only be properly 
understood within his broader conceptual structure of the Real, that which is beyond language 
or knowledge, the Imaginary, the idealised, unified relationship between two subjects, and the 
Symbolic Order, the linguistic and social regulations the subject enters into through the 
introduction of a third term, the Father, into the idealised, Imaginary relationship between 
mother and child.  Within this structure, need, or appetite is situated in the Real. This appetite 
can only be articulated within language, as a demand, but since there is always a gap between 
the language of the Symbolic Order and the Real, the demand can never express the appetites 
of the Real: „Demand in itself bears on something other than the satisfaction it calls 
for‟(Lacan, 2001, p. 317).  There is, then, a gap, or a remnant, between appetite and demand, 
and this gap is the position of desire: 
 
Thus desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that 
results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the phenomenon of their splitting. (Lacan, 
2001, p. 318) 
  
This splitting, between the subject and their desire, between the possibility of fulfilment and 
representation within language, produces the divided subject of the Symbolic Order. The 
concept of a divided or incomplete identity, subject of a continuous making and remaking 
within discourse, is familiar within „structuralist‟ and „post-structuralist‟ sociology. The 
relationship between the divided subject, desire and sexual difference that is also inherent to 
the Lacanian concept, is less well rehearsed within sociological literature.  
 
The conceptual relationship between the divided subject, desire and sexual difference is 
based on clinical observations within psychoanalytic settings. Although the context of clinical 
analysis is very different from that of sociology, it is important to note this empirical 
derivation, which acts both to validate and also to limit the disciplinary re-contextualisation 
of psychoanalytic terms. Sociology cannot reproduce the methods of the analytic relationship: 





The clinical data that provide a basis for the association between sexual difference, 
subjectivity and desire as a remnant outside language, are derived from the analysis of 
resistance in hysterical patients. Paul Verhaeghe sites the „discovery‟ of this association in 
Freud‟s recognition of the failure of his treatment of his hysterical patients (Verhaeghe, 
1999). Freud‟s initial expectation had been that the process of identifying and revealing the 
resistance to the patient would itself constitute a cure. Yet with many of his patients (see also 
Appignanesi and Forrester, 2005), Freud‟s revelations were rejected: 
                                      
1 Sociology and psychoanalysis are activities carried out in distinct professional contexts and deploying methods specialised 
to those contexts. The application of concepts derived from one setting to describe the practices of the other is, therefore, a 
colonisation that recontextualises the colonised activity and transforms the colonising language. For a fuller elaboration of 
recontextualising strategies, see Dowling, 2005, 1998.  
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Hysterical patients didn‟t want to know anything about Freud‟s cure. He was convinced he could bring 
them the Freude, the ability to have pleasure, but they refused. … (Verhaeghe, 1999, p. 130) 
 
Freud‟s patients‟ refusal to accept his interpretations, according to Verhaeghe, led to his 
reconceptualisation of resistance, desire and the nature of the unconscious. These 
developments, Verhaeghe suggests, in turn lead to the Lacanian redefinition of the 
relationship between the subject and desire. Whereas in earlier Freudian theory it was 
assumed that the subject sought the satisfaction of desire, Freud‟s revelation suggested that 
the subject may have some investment in the maintenance of unsatisfied desire: that the 
remnant that resists symbolisation is intricately connected with human subjectivity.  
 
My interest is in the way these ideas are related to a conception of sexual difference, and, 
ultimately, in how they can help us to understand the persistence of the fundamental sexual 
division despite significant changes in social codes regulating both masculinities and 
femininities.  One way to understand the persistence of sexual division, I believe, is through 
the association between the feminine position and the concepts of jouissance and desire.  
 
Jouissance, literally „orgasm‟, represents an Imaginary completeness, an overwhelming 
satisfaction of subjective desire that cannot be symbolised within language. Feminine 
jouissance is often taken as the exemplar of unarticulated desire, and thus forms a link 
between the social order, sexual difference and human subjectivity
2
. The initial basis for this 
link was observations made within clinical practice. Verhaeghe cites an example which can 
help us to understand the relationship between feminine jouissance and a Lacanian 
conception of desire: 
 
A young hysterical woman suffers from frigidity, and the analyst-novice tries as hard as he can to 
make the analysis into a success, which is, from his point of view, to enable her to enjoy orgasms. And 
– miracle of miracles! – the treatment works: “Yesterday, I made love to my husband and I experienced 
an orgasm.” The analyst is in seventh heaven, marvelling at his own qualities as a therapist, until his 
patient wakes him from his rosy dream: “ My husband made me come, but now I definitely don‟t want 
to make love to him anymore.” (Verhaghe, op. cit. p. 131) 
 
The obvious point made here is that the analyst has misunderstood his patient‟s desire, or, in 
Lacanian terms, he has misunderstood the nature of desire, since desire always resists 
interpretation. The broader point that the example can be used to support is that female 
jouissance, women‟s sexual desire, is not represented within the language of the Symbolic 
Order. This second point requires further explanation. 
 
The question of what is or is not represented within language is dependent on the question of 
who controls language and the production of knowledge. Lacan makes this point, citing 
women patients‟ apparent lack of knowledge of their own jouissance, and the way a language 
to describe women‟s experience has been produced by anybody but the women themselves: 
 
The plausibility of what I am claiming here – namely, that woman knows nothing of this jouissance – is 
underscored by the fact that all the time people have been begging them, begging them on their hands 
and knees – I spoke last time of women psychoanalysts – to try to tell us, not a word! We‟ve never 
been able to get anything out of them. So we call this jouissance by whatever name we can come up 
                                      
2
 This link between gender and subjectivity has been criticised by some feminist theorists as both universalising 
and essentialising existing gender divisions ( Butler, 1993, 2000, Fuss, 1989). I am not going to explore these 
criticisms directly here. Persuasive arguments that these readings misrepresent Lacan‟s ideas have been 
presented by numerous theorists (Lacalu, 2000, Ragland Sullivan, 1986, Rose, 1986, Zizek, 1994). 
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with, “vaginal,” and speak of the posterior pole of the uterine orifice and other such “cunt-torsions” 
(conneries) – that‟s the word for it! If she simply experienced it and knew nothing about it, that would 
allow us to cast myriad doubts on this notorious (fameuse) frigidity. (Lacan, 1988, p. 75) 
 
Lacan‟s suggestion that in the end „we‟ have to label what women refuse to name – „we call 
this jouissance by whatever name we can come up with‟ – echoes Virginia Woolf‟s ironic 
question, as she is reading the British Library catalogue of male writing listed under the 
subject heading „women‟: „Why does Samuel Butler say, “Wise men never say what they 
think of women”? Wise men never say anything else apparently‟ (Woolf, 1994, p. 34). Lacan, 
too, is questioning why men, or psychoanalysts, rather than women themselves, are left to 
define what „woman‟ means. The evidence of the inability of women patients in analysis to 
express or accept sexual fulfilment is simply an example of the way in which the codes of the 
Symbolic Order exclude „woman‟ from the possibility of becoming a whole subject. 
Although all human subjects are necessarily divided within language, the Symbolic Order 
provides signifiers that more closely represent masculine desire as a coherent gendered 
identity. It is not the case that jouissance is essentially unavailable to any form of symbolic 
representation, but the dominant codes of a patriarchal social order have not allowed women 
to control the representation of their desire.  
 
It is useful to think a little more about Lacan‟s choice of women‟s jouissance to exemplify his 
description of that which is excluded from language. In choosing jouissance as the defining 
instance of desire, Lacan foregrounds the central function of gender in our production of 
ourselves as (sexed) subjects. The strength of resistance, discovered in the clinical setting, to 
articulating aspects of desire can be explained by reference to the primacy of gender as a 
mark of subjectivity: since it is impossible to be a subject without at the same time being a 
sexed subject, the codes regulating the practice of gender wield excessive power. The picture 
Lacan presents of female patients‟ unwillingness or inability to describe their own experience 
is still relevant, and is plausible as a description of many aspects of women‟s lives today. My 
analysis of the practice of male and female tutors suggests that women academics exhibit a 
similar reticence in expressing desired disciplinary identifications. The fact that women‟s 
desire, whether purely sexual or otherwise, should be so hidden, ignored or repressed 
suggests that conformity to codes of acceptably gendered practices is in some way necessary 
to a stable female subjectivity. Lacanian theory suggests that while masculinity is reinforced 
through identifications with dominant discourses, feminine sexuality, the meaning of 
„woman‟, exists outside dominant structures (Lacan, 2001, 1988). The lack of knowledge of 
female jouissance and women‟s inability to name their desire represent, simultaneously, both 
production of and conformity with the historically specific codes of the Symbolic Order. 
Transgressing these codes incurs a loss of femininity, and therefore puts at risk a stable 
position as a gendered social subject.  
 
The argument that I want to make here is that there is an important distinction between 
changes in codes within specific social fields, such as the university, and the far less flexible 
code regulating identification as a gendered subject within the Symbolic Order.  The 




Recodifications of pedagogic relations in Political Thought classes 
There were significant similarities in the presentation of Political Thought in South and West 
Universities. The canon of modern Political Thought is narrow and extremely stable, and as a 
result the course outline and set texts for the observed modules were very similar. The 
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courses presented canonical positions within liberalism, social liberalism, social contract 
theory and Marxism, and most of the lecturers I talked to found it relatively unproblematic to 
identify their position within these categories.  
 
There were, however, clear contrasts between the pedagogic approaches adopted in the two 
universities. West University put a strong emphasis on student participation in seminars: 
there was even a rumour that class tutors were explicitly directed not to intervene to fill 
silences if students didn‟t respond to a question. The rumour might have been a little extreme, 
but the ethos behind it was confirmed by the course co-ordinator:  
 
Cheryl: Some teachers are more proactive than others. I have one teacher in particular who, if there is a 
blank in the discussion, is more than fearless, really. But the ideal class is one where the teacher says 
very little and where the students do the work. (Cheryl, interview) 
 
Cheryl‟s account of one teacher as „more than fearless‟, which appears to be a reference to 
their ability to sit out uncomfortable silences, re-iterates a fairly common conception of 
students as equal, or even threatening opponents to their teachers (see for example Mirfield, 
2001, pp. 38 – 39). Within West University this conception of the student as able to 
contribute, expected to contribute and, perhaps, in a position of strength when they fail or 
refuse to speak in class, appears to have been embedded within understandings of good 
teaching practice. There were advantages to this approach, in particular the way it correlated 
with high expectations of students in terms of reading and understanding. In contrast, the 
South University tutors had relatively low expectations of students in relation to both the 
completion of weekly reading and contributions to class discussions. Tutors from various 
departments talked about a „decline in the reading culture‟, and this correlated with a 
perception that students want to be „taught by the teacher‟. These two factors were consistent 
with a culture within which fewer students made interventions within sessions and tutors took 
a far more didactic approach than in West University.  
 
The first example I am going to discuss reveals how the teaching style of Alison, a 
postgraduate student teaching an undergraduate Political Thought seminar in West 
University, constitutes a subtle recoding of the assumptions behind the preferred pedagogic 
practices of the institution. At the same time, though, her practice can be read as a refusal to 
identify fully with existing pedagogic and disciplinary structures and as a reiteration of an 
external, feminine position. 
 
Alison‟s style in the Political Theory seminars that I observed was consistent with the 
institutional ideal articulated by Cheryl in that she spoke relatively little and her students, or, 
certain students within the group, spoke a lot. Her teaching style might, then, be explained in 
part by the institutional culture. Another possible factor that may have facilitated student 
participation was the fact that Alison was a post-graduate student, and not the course lecturer. 
It is certainly the case that the students did not feel intimidated by her: the more vocal male 
students interrupted and contradicted her frequently in the seminars and the quieter female 
students that I interviewed all commented on how well she had managed to facilitate their 
participation. This level of student participation can be related to specific methods Alison 
used in the classroom: she asked questions to elicit students‟ views, she encouraged students 
to respond directly to each other‟s points, and she explicitly asked for the opinions of quieter 
students. 
 
Alison herself provided a more personal rationale for this approach. She produced the 
following account in response to, or perhaps in explanation of, an extract from the transcript 
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of a fairly typical, unfocussed section of class discussion where students had been expressing 
views on whether people are essentially group oriented or whether they are essentially 
individual, only gathering together to further individual interests: 
 
Alison: (…) In so far as they have been talking about what drives political communities, it‟s an issue 
that‟s very important (…) I don‟t think they will get it now, but hopefully later, as long as they think 
about it. I really am interested in getting people to think about certain issues. Sometimes the spelling 
out can be too much. If I just went there and said „you mean this and this‟. I don‟t want them to feel 
that they‟re being put in a box, I don‟t want them to feel „this is where I stand‟. Yes, once you‟re past a 
certain level you can do that. You can align yourself with this and that positions, but what I really want 
them to do, on this course, is to think about issues. To see that there are issues, and to see that they can 
deal with them, would be more important for me than saying „I‟m a liberal‟, „I‟m a communitarian‟ 
(…) to come out understanding the things we‟re looking at rather than categorising them.  
 (Alison, West University tutor, interview, p. 5 - 6) 
 
There are two aspects to Alison‟s account here. Firstly, she prioritises developing students‟ 
sense of real conceptual controversies over the precise detail of specific arguments and 
positions: „I am really interested in getting people to think about certain issues. Sometimes 
the spelling out can be too much.‟. This relates to the second aspect, which is her suggestion 
that she wants the students to develop their own response to each issue before they begin to 
identify with generalised categories such as „liberal‟, or „communitarian‟.  Both of these 
aspects of her account can be related to her own academic position and educational 
experience.  She described her discomfort with the need to take up a position in her thesis: 
 
Alison: My position is quite unclear … the position I take in my thesis is probably quite different to 
what I take as a person. The position I take in my thesis is quite left wing, I would say: egalitarian, 
liberal egalitarian, residual Marxist. Purely pragmatic so I can get it out of the way … 
(Alison, West University tutor, interview) 
 
This sense of conforming to disciplinary conventions rather than expressing her own ideas is 
also evident in her description of her previous educational experience as „stifling‟, which 
influenced her student-centred approach and her interest in eliciting students‟ own opinions: 
 
Alison: In their discussions there is a balancing act between not letting things go completely off and on 
the other hand not stifling them when they‟re eighteen, when they are still very eager and they‟re 
curious. And my personal experience has been of being stifled, and so maybe I tend to let them go on 
because I think, okay, practice in saying something, practice in just communicating to others what you 
think, because sometimes that‟s harder than stringing together logical sentences, is to make yourself 
understood. (Alison, West University tutor, interview) 
 
This sense of being „stifled‟ might be considered surprising in the light of the fact that Alison 
herself comes from an academic family, and so might be expected to feel comfortable in an 
academic context. However, Alison‟s experience can also be related to issues of gender. 
When I asked her about gender in the classroom, she said she had never really thought about 
it, because she automatically accepted that she would be „downgraded‟ because of being a 
woman: 
 
Alison: Perhaps I‟m more oblivious to the gender issues, perhaps also because I‟m used to, from my 
upbringing in India and also from my continental upbringing, already you just feel downgraded as a 
woman anyway. So my expectations are probably extremely low.  
(Alison, West University tutor, interview) 
 
Alison‟s strong sense of having been stifled both in her academic and in her educational 
experience contributed to her developing a teaching style that allowed students to express 
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their ideas in a way which conformed to the pedagogic ideal set out by the department. It 
might almost be argued that she was allowing the „stifling‟ she experienced as a student to be 
re-enacted upon her by her (male) students, when they interrupted and contradicted her. Her 
account of her teaching might be read as constructing an extremely coherent rationale for re-
occupying this highly feminised position. 
 
However, in providing this rationale, which prioritises student participation, not as a test of 
their abilities, but rather as a way of helping them to develop the skills and confidence to 
express their ideas, she is also re-codifying pedagogic practice within her university. This 
recodification was largely implicit, enacted within Alison‟s classroom, where quieter students 
– students who said that they rarely or never spoke in their other classes – were sensitively 
encouraged to contribute. However, Alison‟s practice also influenced the more explicit, 
written codes for student participation. Seminar tutors were required to complete a 
departmental report form on each student in their groups, which included a section evaluating 
their classroom participation. At the beginning of the module, Alison had explained this to 
her students, and suggested that any student who felt uncomfortable speaking in class could 
let her know, so they would not be marked down for a lack of contribution. She reported that 
several students had come to speak to her in this way, and she had been able to support them, 
both by explaining their reluctance to contribute on the report, and also by taking care to 
include them where possible in the class discussions.  
 
What I am suggesting in this analysis is that Alison‟s presence as a tutor in West University 
did indeed recodify the practices of the institution, but, at the same time, at a more subjective 
or personal level, it can be suggested that she was reoccupying an external, feminine position 
through her failure to identify with dominant disciplinary structures in either her academic 
writing or in her classroom practice. A comparison with the male Political Theory tutor in my 
study, who did not appear to challenge either disciplinary or pedagogic conventions within 
his classes, may help to clarify the nature of Alison‟s practice. 
 
Bill, the South University Political Thought lecturer, was almost the exact inverse of Alison 
in teaching style, in academic position, and in educational experience. He was from a 
working class family, but went to a competitive grammar school, where he did A-levels early 
and then spent a further year in the sixth form preparing for his first year at Oxford. So by the 
time he arrived there he was already partially inducted into Oxford‟s elite academic culture. 
In addition, he was also already confident of his Marxist politics, and in support of this his 
college at Oxford arranged for him to take several of his courses with Marxist academics 
from other colleges. In discussion of his teaching he articulated an explicit commitment to 
principles of educational equity. However, his active political work was generally directed at 
the level of national policy rather than at the level of the classroom. Unlike Alison, Bill had a 
clear sense of boundaries for legitimate discussion in the classroom, and was uncomfortable 
when the discussion moved away from the academic agenda. Bill‟s teaching style was also 
significantly different from Alison‟s. The pattern of seminars was for Bill to ask for questions 
or comments. When comments or questions were offered, he would respond, frequently at 
some length, expecting students to argue their point, rather than first eliciting more about 
what they might be trying to say. He did not, in contrast to the other tutors I observed, direct 
questions at the students. Whereas in Alison‟s class, there was constant direct interaction and 
discussion between students, this type of general discussion only occurred twice during the 
sessions that I observed at South University, and on each occasion Bill fairly quickly drew 
the discussion to a close, returning to his own exposition of the set author. 
 
 9 
In his interview Bill explained his discomfort with allowing students free rein to discuss ideas 
among themselves. He described the dilemmas he had faced when students had briefly 
engaged in a discussion of this type during the session on Marx: 
 
Bill: This is a very confused debate. I remember it actually.  It didn‟t focus in on arguments, or rather, 
it was about people‟s gut assumptions about politics.  (…) That was where I deliberately sat back, 
because I could see it was chaotic and I wanted to let it go for a bit. Also because, being a Marx person, 
I was worried about taking it over completely (…) I think you have to allow that space to happen, 
because if people are thinking in chaotic ways they have to have the opportunity for that to emerge. I 
think what I tried to do here was to allow people space, and then come in with a long and heavy bit, 
probably much too long, looking at this.( …) I‟m letting it go, because people are actually cutting in 
and engaging, even if they‟re doing it in this rather chaotic way. And they‟re using the space for 
something in a way that it‟s not supposed to be for, but in a way it‟s not a bad thing, that is, to start 
saying something about their own ideas about politics. And they‟re very chaotic ideas  …  
(Bill, South University tutor, interview) 
 
Bill‟s dilemma was whether and how long to allow the discussion to continue, since it was 
„using the space for something ... that it‟s not supposed to be for‟. While he did seem to value 
the fact that „people are actually cutting in and engaging‟, he did not, unlike Alison, have a 
clear rationale for valuing this participation regardless of the actual content of the 
interventions. His inclination, as he himself recognised, was to „come in with a long and 
heavy bit‟.  
 
As both an academic and a political activist, Bill identified with the subject position of an 
authorised speaker in relation to the discipline of political thought on several significant 
levels. Perhaps, in part, it was this strong disciplinary identification that made it difficult for 
him to sit back and let students take control of the discussion. His mode of participation, it 
could be argued, was very similar to that of some of the male students in Alison‟s elite West 
University class and can be related to the culture of Political Thought, within which the 
expression and defence of your own position is the dominant mode of engagement with the 
discipline (see Lapping 2004, 2005).  This is a mode of participation that represents very 
closely both the authorised subject position of Political Thought and also the dominant 
pedagogic culture of South University, and as such, does not challenge or reshape existing 
codifications of academic practice.  
 
The suggestion I am making is that this coincidence of disciplinary and pedagogic practices is 
also related to gendered aspects of subjectivity, which, for men, are constituted through a 
close identification with dominant discourses. For women, in contrast, too close an 
identification with dominant discursive positions can destabilise their performance of 
femininity. Thus although Alison expresses uncertainty about her disciplinary position and a 
sense of being stifled within her education, these symptoms of marginalisation in relation to 
academic practices simultaneously reiterate her identification with the feminine position and 
thus reinforce the gendered nature of her subjective identity. She is, perhaps, similar to the 
patient who said “My husband made me come, but now I definitely don‟t want to make love 
to him anymore.” As a PhD student she might appear to desire identification with academic 
discourse, but this identification would threaten her femininity, which can only be maintained 
by avoiding the fulfilment of this apparent desire. 
 
Recodifications of disciplinary boundaries in American Literature classes 
The American Literature modules observed in the study both conformed to the multi-
methodological approach prevalent in contemporary literary studies. This approach 
incorporates historicist, Marxist and feminist readings and readings that prioritise issues of 
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ethnicity and racism. These readings draw on sociological, psychoanalytic and political 
theory as well as the more traditional literary approaches of New Criticism and close textual 
analysis. I have also argued (Lapping, 2004) that the culture of literary studies and its 
prioritisation of reading and close textual analysis contributed to similarities in the pedagogic 
approaches observed in the two classes: students and tutors in both universities shared a clear 
expectations that set reading would be completed before seminars; both tutors designed 
classroom activities based on analysis of selected extracts of text; and the interpretive nature 
of the discipline, which supports multiple legitimate interpretations, meant that student 
contributions were rarely disputed or „corrected‟ by either the tutor or other students.  
 
However, despite these similarities, there were significant differences in the ways in which 
the two American Literature tutors both conceptualised the boundaries of the discipline and 
constructed their positions as academic/tutor. Hannah, the tutor at East University, did not 
construct a very definite boundary between the discipline of American Literature and the 
personal and political experiences of the students. She also varied her position in classroom 
interactions, moving from the highly academic to the more personal, and at times took a 
relatively light hearted, un-academic approach to what was being said in the sessions.  
Duncan, in contrast, had an explicit conception of the boundary between the academic and 
the personal and maintained a rigorous academic position throughout the sessions. These 
differences are consistent with the definition of the masculine position situated in 
identification with, and the feminine position as on the outside of dominant, in this case 
academic, discourses. 
 
In explaining the purpose of the classes Hannah talked about the overlap between issues 
addressed in the literature and issues relevant to students‟ lives. She suggested that the 
purpose of the taught sessions was to excite students‟ interest in the subject, and to do this, 
she said, it was important to demonstrate how the texts are relevant to the students‟ 
experience. She felt it was both obvious and useful for students to refer to personal issues and 
to their own sense of their gendered, ethnic, or class identity and concluded, „I think that very 
often you can have good seminars when people talk about themselves in that kind of way‟. 
 
Reflecting this approach, there were several instances in the observed sessions where Hannah 
explicitly invited students to reflect on their personal experience. In at least one instance, this 
led away from a direct focus on the set text, while one student speculated about the 
relationship between his gendered and ethnic identities. When she explained how she felt 
about this extract, Hannah suggested that it had raised interesting issues that were not directly 
related to the text, but which she would have liked to follow up: 
 
That conversation left me, I thought it was quite problematic because I wondered whether the fact that I 
think of myself primarily as a female rather than primarily as white is to do with issues of race, you 
know. I don‟t have to think about my whiteness because it‟s the invisible colour, whereas if I was black 
I‟d have to think about it. And maybe we should have had a discussion about that, because I did feel at 
the time that it was quite unsatisfactory. But I didn‟t want to, I suppose I didn‟t want it to go off at a 
tangent.  (Hannah, East University tutor, interview) 
 
Although her sense of a boundary meant that she „didn‟t want it to go off at a tangent‟, it is 
clear that Hannah felt that the issues raised in the class were legitimate material for academic 
discussion.  
 
While the introduction of personal and political issues into literary studies is, clearly, not 
specific to Hannah, the recodification of the discipline that has taken place in recent years can 
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be attributed, at least in part, to the expansion of the academy to include more practitioners 
from groups who have traditionally been underrepresented within higher education. Feminist 
academics, and perhaps women academics in general, can make a persuasive claim to have 
had a significant influence on recent developments in both literary and cultural studies and 
also in sociology. Thus, at one level at least, Hannah‟s conception of disciplinary boundaries 
can be seen as contributing to a more general shift in the codification of literary studies. 
 
Duncan, the North University American Literature tutor, expressed slightly different feelings 
about the introduction of personal issues into his teaching sessions. In the interview, we 
discussed an extract from a session on slave narratives where a female student, Razia, had 
talked about the way she responded to different representations of women‟s lives. She had 
suggested that her ability to identify with women characters was dependent on the extent to 
which she shared their emotions and experiences. She compared her experience of reading 
Toni Morrison‟s novel Beloved to her experience of reading Harriet Jacobs‟ autobiographical 
narrative, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, suggesting that she found the narrative easier 
to read because it downplayed the violence Jacobs had suffered under slavery. In her 
narrative, Jacobs describes how her master made advances to her, but does not depict an 
actual rape. Several students in the class questioned how convincing this was, and Razia had 
responded to this suggestion: 
 
Razia: When I read it, I just took it that he hadn‟t raped her. But now, speaking about it, and also other 
texts that I‟ve read about the time, not autobiographies, just texts written about slavery, like Beloved, it 
was more prominent. Rape was much more prominent in it. In this one it was more like a personal 
journey through slavery, and I found it easier to relate to, because sometimes, texts about slavery can 
be really shocking, and even though you sympathise with people, because what‟s happened to them is 
so awful, it‟s so far removed from what you‟ve experienced yourself. Whereas I found it easier to read 
her text [the Jacobs]. It was just a woman going through life and there were like emotional things 
involved. 
 (North University, Slave Narratives) 
 
Duncan‟s response when we looked at this extract in his interview was slightly negative: 
 
Towards the end of the extract it becomes a bit un-textually grounded, not un-textually grounded, but 
the level of analysis is quite sort of shallow, perhaps, or basic, „I found this really shocking‟, „it was 
how I related to it as a sort of person in my contemporary space‟ – all that stuff that‟s sort of quite A 
levelly. But I think, I don‟t mind that happening occasionally in classes, because I think those are the 
ways you respond to a text and you do have to acknowledge that (…) I do want to sort of push those 
buttons in people. I wouldn‟t want this sort of thing to appear in a student‟s essay, but there is a place 
for that in class.   (Duncan, North University tutor, interview) 
 
While he acknowledges that „there is a place for that in class‟, Duncan suggests that Razia‟s 
reference to her personal experience is „shallow‟, „basic‟, and „quite A levelly‟. He is 
constructing a clear distinction between legitimate and illegitimate modes of analysis, and 
explicit reference to the personal appears, for him, to be illegitimate.  
 
The contrast between the tutors affects their positioning in relation to a certain conception of 
what it means to be academic. Duncan‟s seriousness during the classes, his discomfort with 
what he sees as un-academic contributions from students and his consistent use of a precise 
and rigorous academic language, constituted a strong identification between him and a formal 
conception of academic modes of thinking. Hannah, in contrast, explicitly distanced herself 
from this position through the use of informal language, through the interjection of offhand 
comments during the seminars and through references to personal issues. Duncan expressed 
concern about an incident where he hadn‟t remembered a detail about a text during a seminar, 
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saying, „what I remember about that was not being quite in control‟. In contrast, Hannah 
expressed less concern about such losses of control, saying, „I admit to not knowing things all 
the time.‟  It would be possible to suggest that both in her academic interests and in her 
interaction as a teacher, Hannah values the personal and is relatively comfortable 
relinquishing control, while Duncan is sceptical of the value of the personal in academic 
work and is uncomfortable relinquishing control. However, an analysis more in line with a 
Lacanian conception of the feminine can provide a less individualising account. It is possible 
to align the ability to identify fully with academic discourse with the masculine ability to 
express sexual desire. Just as female analysands have to deny knowledge of their own 
jouissance in order to maintain their gender position, so, perhaps, female academics have to 
disguise their own seriousness in their intellectual pursuits. Academic work, like sex, within 
this conceptual framework can be described as the embodiment of the masculine position, 
not, of course, because women are inherently less capable of, or derive less pleasure from 
either activity, but because conformity with socially imperative codes of femininity requires 
the repression of such pleasures.  
 
Conclusions: social regulation and subjective identification 
The subjective positions of both male and female tutors in the study are more complex than, 
perhaps, my argument has suggested. The male tutors appeared more concerned with the 
maintenance of disciplinary boundaries, which supported an identification with dominant, 
masculine discursive positions. But this identification with a position of mastery is neither 
complete nor satisfactory: it is a powerful regulative demand on the subject that Stephen 
Frosh has described as „both deathly and creative‟ (Frosh, 1994, p. 74).  Frosh points out that 
“„having‟ the phallus attached to oneself is no guarantee of stability of identity; quite the 
contrary, it forces the man into an obsession with „getting things straight‟ and a terror of loss 
which must seem comic to the penis-free woman” (ibid, p. 77).  Free of this „terror‟, both 
female tutors in the study, in different ways, disrupted disciplinary boundaries and distanced 
themselves from too close an identification with academic discourse. Thus, I have argued, 
their presence within the academy necessarily instituted re-codifications of existing 
disciplinary and pedagogic discourses, while simultaneously reiterating a feminine desire that 
is positioned outside the dominant structures of the Symbolic Order.  
 
This analysis does not foreclose possibilities for change, but foregrounds the persistence of 
sexual difference as a primary organising principle of social relations, as well as the symbolic 
and psychic dangers of transgressing codifications of sexual division. Psychoanalytically 
informed feminist theory struggles to find a political strategy that destabilises gender 
hierarchies, but that does not embrace an impossible outside of language and the law (Butler, 
1993, 2000, Rose, 1986, Kristeva, 1986a, 1986b). Luce Irigaray and Lois McNay both 
criticise Lacanian approaches as leaving no space between language, subjectivity and the 
social. Both, in quite different ways, reconceptualise the disjunctures between sensuous, 
bodily experience and the symbolic realm as a more radical, creative „imaginary‟, offering 
possibilities for a positive reconfiguration of gender (McNay, 2000, Irigaray, 1985, 1993, 
Whitford, 1991). Kristeva‟s conceptualisation of the „semiotic‟ is also sometimes presented 
in this way, as a potential strategic space for the radical subversion of linguistic structures. 
  
It might, then, be possible to construct an interpretation of the practice of female tutors as a 
destabilising transgression of phallocentric institutional structures. The reiteration of the 
feminine within pedagogic relations can be interpreted as radically shifting the relationship 
between students, tutor, and institutionalised knowledge. But the effects of these agentic or 
transgressive moments are unpredictable (see Frosh, 1994, ch. 6, Butler, 1993, 2000), and the 
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stability of such re-codifications depends on a range of contextual factors. Alison‟s position 
as a post-graduate student may restrict the sustainability of any changes to pedagogic practice 
she may have initiated within her institution. Recodifications articulated from Hannah‟s 
position of relative institutional authority may prove more sustainable.  There is, though, also 
evidence that disciplinary re-codifications are often unstable or marginalised within the 
academy
3
.  Alternatively, as Kristeva has suggested, such radical moments may be 
neutralised when they are taken up and absorbed into professional practice (Kristeva, 1986b).   
 
My argument is that these simultaneous effects of change but continuity can be better 
understood if read as acting at the different levels of social practice and psychic 
subjectification. While change may be instituted at the level of practice within specific social 
fields, the fields of disciplinary or pedagogic practice, for example, my analysis suggests that 
at the level of subjectification the recodifications that mark such changes can also be read as a 
reiteration of primary gendered identifications. Change can thus take place within specific 
social fields while the fundamental gender division, primary mark of subjectivity within the 
Symbolic Order, is maintained, carrying with it significant further connotations for the 
embodied relations between individual subjects and their changing cultural, social and 
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